Ngwenya Muncini v Elisha Takundwa Mangwiro

### Preamble
1
HH 479-13
HC 9129/11
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NGWENYA MUNCINI

versus

ELISHA TAKUNDWA MANGWIRO

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

MAFUSIRE J

HARARE, 17, 18, 22 October 2013 & 11 December 2013

Civil trial

L. Mashanyare, for the plaintiff

D. Muzawazi,for defendant

MAFUSIRE J: The plaintiff, Ngwenya Muncini, but whose second name was in the pleadings spelt variously as Munzini, Manzini or Mancini, claimed an order of specific performance against the defendant, one Elisha Takundwa Mangwiro. The claim was in respect of a property described as No 688/5 Mbizo, Kwekwe (hereafter referred to as “the house” or “the Kwekwe house”). The house had three main rooms and a toilet. Plaintiff alleged that in 2002 his employer, one Gibson Ndhlela, but whose second name was in some documents spelt as Nhlela, had bought him the house as an employment benefit. He alleged that the sale had been negotiated and concluded by the employer’s wife, whose names were also spelt differently in the pleadings as Nobenhle Ndlela, Nobehle Ndhlela, Nomunhle Nhlela, Nobuhle Nhela or Noble Nhela. I shall from now on refer to her as “Mrs Ndhlela”.The different spellings for the different persons in this matter was sheer carelessness in drafting.

It was alleged that Mrs Ndhlela had concluded the sale with the defendant through his two sons, Luckmore Chimina (“Luckmore”) and Hardwork Chimina (“Hardwork”). The Mangwiros and the Chiminas were one people.

It was common cause that the plaintiff had taken occupation of the house in 2002.He had enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession from that time until August 2011 when there had been a fracas. It was alleged the defendant and Hard work had forced themselves into the house. At that time the plaintiff had been away in South Africa. Through her lawyers the plaintiff’s wife had obtained an ex parte order of spoliation.

The defendant denied the sale. He alleged that at all relevant times the plaintiff had been his tenant. Hard work had arranged a verbal lease with the plaintiff. Hard work had been fully in charge of the rental collections. The defendant himself had long retired to his rural home in Rusape. Of the three rooms at the house the defendant said that it had been his policy to reserve one for his own use whenever he was in Kwekwe. Only two rooms had been made available to the plaintiff and his family. The defendant counter claimed for the eviction of the plaintiff and all those claiming occupation through him.

It was common cause that the parties were meeting physically for the first time at court during the trial.

The plaintiff gave evidence. He said he had not been a party to the transaction. Everything had been done for him by Mrs Ndhlela. Mrs Ndhlela and Hardwork had been workmates at the High Court. Having retired and being desirous of relocating to his rural home in Rusape the defendant had sold the Kwekwe house to buy another property in a town nearer his rural home.

The plaintiff further alleged that the purchase price had been agreed at 800 000 Zimbabwean dollars (“ZW$”). It had been paid partly in cash and partly through a swap deal. The cash payment was said to have been ZW$450 000. The swap was said to have been of an undeveloped piece of land situate 2563 Cherutombo, Marondera, valued at ZW$350 000 which the Ndhlelas had allegedly surrendered to the defendant (hereafter referred to as the “Marondera stand”). After the deal had been sealed Hardwork had taken the plaintiff to Kwekwe to show him the house and to hand over occupation to him. There had been three tenants at the house. Two had moved out as plaintiff had moved in. The third had stayed on for one more month as he looked for alternative accommodation elsewhere.

Plaintiff also said that an agreement of sale had been drawn up. Hardwork had taken it to his father, the defendant, for signature. However, Hardwork had never returned. He had simply disappeared. He had soon become unreachable on the cell phone. Unfortunately, Mrs Ndhlela had subsequently died in a traffic accident in 2006.Matters had just been left hanging.

The plaintiff said he and his family had stayed at the house from 2002 until August 2011 when Hard work had resurfaced demanding rentals for his occupation. His father, the defendant, had also arrived and had tried to force himself into the house. The case had ended up at the Magistrate’s court in Kwekwe. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was now denying the sale allegedly because he was thinking that he could make more money in the new currency. Allegedly he was trying to take advantage of the death of Mrs Ndhlela.

The plaintiff called Mr Ndhlela as a witness. Mr Ndhlela testified that at all relevant times he employed the plaintiff as a builder. As part of the plaintiff’s conditions of employment he was entitled to be provided with accommodation.  Mrs Ndhlela had worked in the Sheriff’s office at the High Court. One of the defendant’s sons had also worked with Mrs Ndhlela at the High Court. Mr Ndhlela had not been directly involved in the transaction. He had merely financed the purchase. He had also provided a vehicle for his wife, the plaintiff and the Chiminas to travel to Kwekwe for the hand-over take-over of the house.

Mr Ndhlela confirmed the plaintiff’s claim that they had swapped their Marondera stand for the Kwekwe house. He said that although the Marondera stand had been in the name of one Agnes Makute, his late wife had subsequently taken ownership of not only that stand but also of another one in Ruwa. Agnes Makutewas an aunt.

Mr Ndhlela said hehad paid the ZW$450 000 top up in two instalments; one by real time gross settlement (RTGS) through Century Bank Limited, and the other by a cheque in favour of his late wife. He no longer had any records. Century Bank had closed down. The cheque had not been returned so it must have been cashed successfully.  It had been a long time and he had destroyed a lot of worthless documents when his wife had died in 2006.

Mr Ndhlela further said that it could not possibly be true that the plaintiff had been the defendant’s tenant. He himself had not paid any rent to anyone for the house because they had bought it. How could the plaintiff have stayed at the house for such a long time without any disturbance if he had not bought it, Mr Ndhlela retorted repeatedly in cross-examination?

Mr Ndhlela also said that the plaintiff had even renovated the toilet by installing a new chamber and tiles. He himself had seen the agreement of sale. It had been signed by his late wife and the two Chimina brothers as witnesses. However, he had appreciated that until the defendant had also signed it the document would have no legal validity. He had paid the purchase price before the signed agreement because everything had been based on trust. The Chimina who had worked with his wife had taken the agreement to his father but had never come back. He had only resurfaced in 2011 demanding rentals for the property. The matter had ended up in court. He had signed an affidavit on an urgent basis to explain the situation and so help the plaintiff at the magistrate’s court.

Mr Ndhlela’s affidavit and several other documents were produced as exhibits. I shall revert to them in due course.

After Mr Ndhlela’s testimony the plaintiff closed his case.

The defendant opened his case with his own evidence. He denied that he had sold the house to anyone, let alone the defendant. He had bought the house in terms of the home ownership scheme of the Kwekwe Municipality way back in 1980. He had taken 25 years to complete the purchase price. In 1988 he had retired from employment and had relocated to his rural home in Rusape to look after the homestead left behind by his father who had died. He denied that he had relocated in 2002 or that he had wanted to buy a property nearer his rural home. He had left his son, Hard work, fully in charge of the administration of the house. Hard work had had the power and authority to install tenants and to collect rentals. However, he had had no authority to sell the house. Nobody else had had that authority except himself and his wife. He could not accept that his sons Hard work or Luckmore could do such a thing as to sell the house behind his back. Both sons had been well groomed. They did have their own properties and businesses elsewhere and therefore they would not stand to benefit from such a small house in such a place like Mbizo.

The defendant denied that he had entered into any swap deal for the Marondera stand. He said he knew nothing about that and he did not want to hear about the issue at all. He said he had heard a lot about some urban people who were in the business of duping house owners of their properties. The plaintiff had merely been his tenant. He and the plaintiff had never met before. Hardwork had organised the verbal lease after one of the long standing tenants by the name of “Baba vaCliff” was leaving. There had been no three tenants at the house as the plaintiff alleged. He had received rentals from the plaintiff through Hardwork.

The defendantsaid he could remember neither the period that the plaintiff had paid rentals nor the amounts thereof. He said Hardwork had all the details. However, he said he remembered that there had been a period when he had got no rentals at all. The local currency had lost value. Hardwork had left for South Africa. He himself could stay for long periods of time away from the house because he was now old and was often down with illness. However, it had been his policy with all the tenants at the house that a single room would always be reserved for him for his use whenever he was in town. The defendant said he had seen no agreement of sale. He insisted that he could not have signed any agreement of sale for the house because the house was his legacy for his children and grandchildren.

Hardwork testified. His evidence corroborated much of what the defendant had said. However, there were some significant details. He had been employed by the prison services and had been attached to the High Court at Harare. Although he had known Mrs Ndhlela there had been no special relationship or closeness between them. He had known her merely as one of the employees at the Sheriff’s department. On induction he had been introduced to her and several other employees.

Hardwork denied that he had sold the house to Mrs Ndhlela. He said when a long standing tenant by the name of “Baba vaCliff” was leaving, the defendant had instructed him to look for another tenant. “Baba vaCliff” had recommended a relative of his by the name of Mr Nyoni. “Baba vaCliff” had given him Mr Nyoni’s cell number. It had turned out that Mr Nyoni had been the same person as the plaintiff. It had also turned out that the plaintiff had also been known to Mrs Ndhlela.

Hardwork further testified that he had arranged a verbal lease with the plaintiff. He denied that anyone had taken him and the plaintiff to the Kwekwe house but said that he had driven in his own vehicle. The plaintiff had met him at the house. There had been no three tenants as alleged by the plaintiff. There had only been “Baba vaCliff” as tenant and no others. The plaintiff had paid an amount of ZW$5 000as part deposit and part rentals. He had continued to receive rentals from the plaintiff but the money was losing value rapidly. He could not remember how much he had been receiving as rentals or for how long.

Hardwork said it soon became not worth his while to continue to be driving from Norton where he stayed all the way to Kwekwe just to collect the paltry rental. He had been spending more in fuel than the value of the rentals that he would collect. Eventually he had relocated to South Africa. That had been in 2008. He had come back in 2010 after Zimbabwe had adopted the multi-currency system. However, the plaintiff had continuously refused to agree ona new rental denominated in United States dollars. The rates and electricity had been in arrears. In 2011 he had sought to evict the defendant’s family. The wife had resisted. He had caused the municipality of Kwekwe to disconnect the water supply to the house and the power authority to disconnect the electricity. However, the plaintiff’s family had stayed put. In August 2011 there had been a strong misunderstanding. The matter had ended up at the Magistrate’s Court at Kwekwe.  But nothing had been concluded. The Magistrate’s Court had said that since the plaintiff had issued a summons at the High Court, it was now up to that court to resolve the dispute.

Hardwork denied that he had at one time disappeared. He had merely been transferred by his employers from Harare to Selous which he said was a stone throw away. If the plaintiff or his employers had wanted to get hold of him he had been a mere phone call away.

After Hardwork’s evidence the defendant closed his case. Counsel advised that the defendant would have wanted to call Luckmore but that unfortunately, he was at work in South Africa and had been denied time off.

In my view the plaintiff’s case was limping right from the beginning. Except for the bit about him having gone to Kwekwe in 2002 to take occupation of the house the plaintiff was personally privy to nothing else. His testimony was plainly hearsay. It was of no value in the face of a strong and consistent denial by the defendant and his witness. So to prove the alleged sale the plaintiff could only rely on the testimonies of others. His most important witness would have been Mrs Ndhlela. But unfortunately she was deceased. His next best was Mr Ndhlela. But again he also was in no better position than the plaintiff himself. He had not been part of the deal. He had merely partly sponsored it. So again Mr Ndhlela’s testimony was unhelpful hearsay. But the situation was rather far worse for the plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s documents were produced mainly through Mr Ndhlela. But none of them helped the situation. Plaintiff’s case falls on basic and elementary requirements for any contract. The three essentials of a valid contract of sale are (1) the agreement (consensus ad idem); (2) the thing sold (merx) and (3) the price (pretium); see MACKEURTAN Sale of Goods in South Africa. If any one of these constituents is absent there is no sale; see R H CHRISTIE Business Law in Zimbabwe. At p 31 of that book the learned author says that the first logical step in deciding whether a contract has come into existence is to enquire whether in any given case an agreement was reached. He says it all means the same thing to say an agreement by consent, a true agreement, a meeting of the minds, a coincidence of the wills orconsensus ad idem.

Regarding the parties, the plaintiff’s case was that the defendant had sold him the house. But there was absolutely nothing to show that the defendant had ever been aware of the alleged agreement. It was common cause that the parties had never met before until the day of the trial. It was also common cause that the late Mrs Ndhlela and the defendant had never met. Whilst a prior physical meeting between the parties is obviously not a requirement for a valid contract, there simply was no agreement of sale or any other document from whichit could be inferred that there had been some agreement between the parties. Other than the plaintiff and his witness whose hearsay testimonies referred to an agreement of sale there was simply no other person who knew about that document. Not even a file copy of the alleged document was available.

Furthermore, despite the plaintiff’s claim in the summons having been directed solely against the defendant, there was some allegation, particularly by the plaintiff’s witness, that the plaintiff had bought the house from the “defendant’s family”. Evidently, by “defendant’s family”the plaintiff’s witness was referring to the defendant and his two sons Hardwork and Luckmore.  But in the face of a strong denial by Hardwork and in the absence of any evidence whatsoever, I am unable to bind the defendant or his alleged family to something that the plaintiff failed to prove existed. It was not the plaintiff’s case that the defendant’s sons had the power or authority to sell the house on behalf of their father. It was not the plaintiff’s case that the defendant had ostensible authority to sell the house on behalf of their father. In the circumstances I conclude that the defendant was simply not a party to the alleged agreement.

Regarding consensus ad idem, there was simply no evidence to suggest that the minds of the parties had ever met. Both the plaintiff and his witness referred to an affidavit by the late Mrs Ndhlela in 2002 as evidence of the agreement of sale in respect of the Kwekwe house and the swap arrangement in respect of the Marondera stand. The defence did not challenge or object to that affidavit. But plainly it is of no consequence or of any assistance to the plaintiff. The affidavit read as follows:

“I Nobuhle Ndhlela ID 08 – 164164 W 29 residing at 14 A Inner lithen Rd Mandara do hereby solemnly and sincerely swear/declare the following:- THAT I have sold stand 2563 Cherutombo medium measuring 1000 sq meters to Luckymore Chimina ID No 42 – 1197108 S 42 for the sum of $350,000 Three hundred and fifty Thousand dollars”

Mr Ndhlela said the affidavit had been worded in that manner in order to make it easier for the Chiminas to get transfer from the municipality of Marondera. He also said that the affidavit mentioned Luckmore instead of Hardwork who allegedly had worked together with Mrs Ndhlela and allegedly with whom the alleged agreement of sale had been negotiated because it had been decided to deal not with one but with the two of them as some kind of insurance against deceit. It was thought that the probability of two brothers, as opposed to only one, crafting something sinister to dupe them would be minimal.

Mr Ndhlela struck me as a sincere and honest man. However, he also struck me as someone who paid little attention to detail. Firstly, he said that the whole deal had been based on trust. That was why they had paid before any agreement had been signed. But in the next breath he was talking about their fear of being duped if they dealt with a single family member.

Secondly, the rest of the documents and part of his testimony destroyed whatever could have been the plaintiff’s case. Starting with that affidavit, it plainly made no reference to the sale of the Kwekwe house. It made no mention of the defendant, or even Hardwork who the evidence alleged was the one involved. It made no mention of the swap. How a sale would be more acceptable to the Marondera municipality than a swap or exchange was not explained. The point therefore is that Mrs Ndhlela’s affidavit was neither the evidence of the alleged sale of the Kwekwe house nor of the swap in respect of the Marondera stand.

The evidence showed that both parties’ legal practitioners had written to the Marondera municipality for information on the history of the Marondera stand evidently in preparation for the trial. The municipality had responded to both letters. The information had been the same. The stand had become a road! Mrs Ndhlela had never owned it at any time! It had initially been allocated to one Agnes Makute in June 1999. She had failed to develop it. It had been re-possessed and had been re-allocated to a Mr P. M. Maisva in November 2002. The letter of allocation by the municipality of Marondera to Mr Maisva on 14 November 2002 was part of the defendant’s bundle of documents. The allocation to Mr Maisva had subsequently been “nullified” to pave way for a road. Hardwork said that he had personally gone to the Marondera municipality and had physically inspected the area. Indeed the alleged stand had become a road. The municipality had given him a number of documents that included the aforesaid letters to the lawyers.

The year 2002 was, according to Mrs Ndhlela’s affidavit, when she had “sold” the Marondera stand. But the documents showed that it was in the same year that it had been repossessed from Agnes Makute and re-allocated to someone else. That was consistent with the defendant’s denial that he had ever taken ownership of that property. Mr Ndhlela tried to dilute the significance of the letters from the municipality of Marondera, among other things, by alleging that after they had transferred the Marondera stand to the defendant they themselves had lost any further interest in it and that the defendant might have lost the stand after he had failed to service it himself. However, that was a long shot. There was simply no evidence of that. On the contrary, the available evidence, as I have shown above, supported the defendant’s version.

The next difficulty for the plaintiff was that in his evidence Mr Ndhlela said he made two payments for the cash top up of ZW$450 000-00; one by RTGS and the other by a cheque in favour of his wife. He could not remember the individual amounts. Furthermore, this plainly contradicted his own affidavit which he said he had made to assist the plaintiff for the court case at the Kwekwe Magistrate’s court.

Mr Ndhlela’s affidavit, which formed part of the bundle of documents for both parties, starts by stating that his late wife had organised the purchase of the Kwekwe house from “Luckymore Chimina”. But plaintiff’s evidence was that the alleged sale had been between Mrs Ndhlela and Hardwork, not Luckmore.

Mr Ndhlela’s affidavit then went on to mention the fact that the purchase price to Chimina had been in the form of the Marondera stand to him and “a one-time cash payment was done to him personally by my late wife.” Mr Ndhlela was repeatedly quizzed in cross-examination on why the affidavit had referred to a one-time payment, as opposed to two instalments, one by RTGS and the other by cheque. He was also quizzed on why the affidavit alleged that it had been his wife and not himself personally who had made the payment as he had said in his evidence. Mr Ndhlela’s basic explanation was that a payment by RTGS or by cheque was just as good as a cash payment. He also said that the affidavit had been prepared in a hurry and that as such a number of details had been spared.

Mr Ndhlela’s affidavit also stated that after the alleged agreement of sale had been drawn up his wife had proceeded to sign it but however that Chimina had refused to sign allegedly claiming that the defendant whom he had given the cash would have to sign. However, in his evidence Mr Ndhlela said that the two Chimina brothers had both signed as witnesses. Naturally, the defence pounced on such obvious contradictions.

Much as I viewed him as a sincere man, my difficulty with Mr Ndhlela’s testimony was that, among other things, he could not even remember the breakdown of the payments which he said he had made. Coupled with the fact that independent information from the Marondera Municipality refuted the claim that Mrs Ndhlela had ever owned the Marondera stand, and taking into account the other numerous contradictions in the evidence, it would be manifestly irrational to bind the defendant to the alleged agreement.

Finally on the plaintiff’s case, the defendant produced the home ownership agreement dated 11 June 1980 between himself and the municipality of Kwekwe, then spelt Que Que. It was a standard term agreement common in those days for township houses owned by local authorities. The agreement recited that the municipality was the owner of the house and that the defendant was desirous of purchasing it. The agreement then went on to record the defendant’s right to purchase the house; the purchase price and the period of payment. Then clause 14 read as follows:

“14

CESSION BY PURCHASER

The purchaser shall not part with possession of the property or any part thereof or cedes or assign or hypothecate this Agreement or any rights hereunder to any person without the previous consent in writing of the Municipality.”

None of the parties adverted to this provision during evidence. In his closing submissions Mr Mashanyare for the plaintiff argued something to the effect that the local authorities did not normally interfere with the beneficiaries’ rights to sell township houses and that in any event the fact that the plaintiff had stayed at the house for such a long period of time must mean that the municipality had acquiesced to the sale.

On the other hand Mr Muzawazi for the defendant referred to the incident alluded to by Hard work in his evidence to the effect that he had caused the municipality employees to disconnect the water supply to the house during the fracas with the plaintiff’s wife in August 2011 and argued that this must mean that the Kwekwe municipality had not consented to the alleged sale.

The submissions by both counsel lacked substance. There was simply no evidence by the plaintiff that those local authorities in general ordinarily waived, or that the municipality of Kwekwe in particular had waived, expressly or tacitly, the requirement for a written consent to any intended cession or assignment of rights under those types of agreements. That the plaintiff may have stayed at the house from 2002 to 2011 was no evidence that the municipality had become aware of his alleged purchase, let alone of its acquiescence.

On the other hand the fact that Hard work may have caused a municipality employee to disconnect the water supply, itself a very dubious procedure, was hardly the evidence that the municipality had not consented to the sale. The disconnection was in reality made by Hardwork using a municipality employee for the purposes of forcing compliance by the plaintiff.

In all the premises the plaintiff, on whom the onus lay, failed to prove the agreement of sale between himself and the defendant.

Turning now to the defendant’s counter claim for eviction, I find that no evidence of a valid lease agreement was proved. As in a contract of sale, the essentials for a valid lease are the parties i.e. the landlord and the tenant; the property let; the period of the lease and the rent payable;J T R GIBSONSouth African Mercantile & Company Lawand the case of De Jager v Sisana.

In this matter there certainly was some relationship between the parties that was brought about through the agency of the late Mrs Ndhlela on behalf of the plaintiff, and Hardwork on behalf of the defendant. That explains why the plaintiff had stayed at the defendant’s house for more than a decade. The plaintiff explained that relationship as one flowing from a contract of purchase and sale. But I have ruled against that. The defendant explained it as one of landlord and tenant. But I also rule against that. Just like the plaintiff before him, the defendant has failed to prove some elementary essentials for a valid contract of lease.

Other than a once off payment of ZW$5000 alleged by Hard work as having been made by the plaintiff in 2002 allegedly as part deposit and part rent, neither the defendant nor Hardwork could state what the amounts for the rentals were and for what period the plaintiff had allegedly paid the rent. In one of his retorts Mr Ndhlela, insisting that they had bought the house, asked what value was the house to the defendant if he could stay away from it for such a long time with the plaintiff in occupation who was paying nothing for his stay. This has credence.

The onus was on the defendant to prove a lease. He failed to discharge it. There was no proof of an agreement or a consensus ad idem in respect of a lease. So it remains a puzzle the nature of the legal relationship between the parties all those years.

However, notwithstanding that the plaintiff has failed to prove a sale, and the defendant has failed to prove a lease, that is not the end of the matter. It was common cause that the defendant was the owner of the Kwekwe house. An owner of a property is entitled to the full enjoyment of the property unless by agreement or operation of the law there has been a diminution of that right. Ownership is the real right that potentially confers the most or comprehensive control over a thing. This means that the right of ownership entitles the owner to do with his or her thing as he or she deems fit, subject to the limitations imposed by law; see SILBERBERG AND SCHOEMAN The Law of Property. The learned authors say at pp 92 – 93 of that book that in principle an owner has exclusive control over the thing that he or she owns. This means that he or she can enforce that control against the whole world. The owner’s rights include the entitlement to use the thing (ius utendi); the entitlement to possess the thing (ius possidendi) and the entitlement to claim the thing from any unlawful possessor (ius vindicandi).

Therefore, in this case, unless the plaintiff had established a superior right to deprive the defendant of his right to the full enjoyment of the house, which he has not, the defendant is plainly entitled to recover possession of the property.

DISPOSITION

The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant for the transfer of the property known as 688/5 Mbizo, Kwekwe, is hereby dismissed. The defendant’s counter-claim against the plaintiff for his eviction from the property and all those claiming occupation through him is hereby granted.

The plaintiff has been in occupation of the defendant’s house for more than a decade. In his subjective state of mind the house had become his property. However, the plaintiff at all times knew that he had no title to the property. Therefore, he knew, or ought to have known that his claim to ownership and the concomitant right to occupation were precarious. His belief that the defendant’s son whom he had regarded as some agent to the agreement of sale had disappeared was in no way a bar to him taking transfer of the property or a session of the defendant’s rights thereto if he had properly applied his mind to the issue. He seems to have woken up to this reality only after the defendant had taken moves to evict his family in August of 2011.

However, in spite of his apparent lack of diligence I consider that given his peaceful and undisturbed length of occupation of the property the plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable notice to vacate. I consider 90 days to be a reasonable period under the circumstances. There is no question of holding-over damages as it was not part of the defendant’s counter-claim. At any rate I have ruled that there was no agreement of lease between the parties. None of them has proved to me what it is that bound them together in respect of that house. Therefore the plaintiff is simply entitled to 90 days to relocate.

In the circumstances, it is ordered that the plaintiff and all those claiming occupation through him shall vacate the defendant’s property situate 688/5 Mbizo, Kwekwe, within 90 days of the date of this judgment failing which the Sheriff for Zimbabwe or his lawful deputy or assistant deputy, shall be authorised, empowered and directed to evict from the property the plaintiff and all those claiming occupation through him. The plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs of suit.

Masawi & Partners, legal practitioners for the plaintiff

Mtombeni, Mukwesha, Muzawazi & Associates, legal practitioners for the defendant