Nigel Tendai Sithole v FBC Bank Ltd and Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe N.O

### Preamble
1
HH 140-21
HC 111/21
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NIGEL TENDAI SITHOLE

versus

FBC BANK LTD

and

RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE N.O

HIGH COURT OF ZIMBABWE

MUREMBA J

HARARE, 31 March 2021

Urgent Chamber Application

Applicant in person

D Muchada, for the 1st respondent

No appearance for the 2nd respondent

MUREMBA J: Due to the COVID-19 pandemic this is a matter which I indicated to the parties that I would determine on the papers without hearing oral submissions. The directions that I gave for the filing of papers including heads of argument were duly complied with. I am indebted to the applicant and the first respondent’s counsel for that.  The second respondent which is the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe N.O (RBZ) did not respond to the application.

The first respondent has three digital banking platforms namely:

Mobile banking platform under USSD quick code *220#;

WhatsApp digital banking platform marketed as “Noku” under Whatsapp Number +263776670211; and

The mobile software application called “Mobile Moola App (collectively referred to as “digital banking platforms”)

This is an urgent chamber application by the applicant who is a practising legal practitioner for an interim order suspending the operation of the three digital banking platforms. On the return day the applicant will be seeking among other reliefs, a declaratur that these three digital banking platforms are unlawful.

It is the applicant’s averment that the digital banking platforms are operating in contravention of ss 15, 16 and 17 of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act [Chapter 9:24]. It is the applicant’s contention that these digital platforms are operating with little regard to Know -Your- Client (KYC) verification process provided for in the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act in so far as they relate to the opening of bank accounts. Their verification process does not comply with the established Know-Your-Client (KYC) protocols. As a result, this is perpetuating criminal conduct.

Apparently, these three digital banking platforms allow the first respondent’s clients to easily access their bank accounts, buy airtime, check bank balances, buy electricity tokens, pay various bills, transfer money to other people from the comfort of their homes, wherever this could be, even from the remotest parts of the country, without physically visiting the bank. The digital banking platforms also allow customers to open bank accounts without the need of physically attending to a branch of the first respondent.

It is not disputed that on 6 January 2021, a person who is to the applicant unknown, using one of the first respondent’s digital banking platforms, successfully opened a bank account number 6017042200218469 with the first respondent in the name of the applicant. The opening of the account was done fraudulently without the knowledge and consent of the applicant. The imposter started duping unsuspecting members of the public of their money through some rent to buy car scheme as he or she masqueraded as the applicant. People were made to deposit money into this account.  This came to the attention of the applicant on 31 January 2021 when a Facebook user by the name of Samantha Ndaba posted on the applicant’s Facebook page demanding that the applicant pays her back the money that he had swindled from her. Upon engaging her privately, that is when the applicant discovered that some person unknown to him had opened a bank account with the first respondent in his name. That person was pretending to be the applicant. He was advertising the sale of cars on a rent to buy arrangement and was luring victims to part with their money under the belief that they were dealing with a legal practitioner. The applicant averred that he then posted an announcement on his Facebook page to alert the public about the scam. Upon doing so, he learnt that there were scores of victims of this scam and that the imposter had even managed to open an Ecocash account in his name as well.

The applicant reported the matter to the police and to the Law Society of Zimbabwe. He also attended at the first respondent’s head office on 1 February 2021 and made an official complaint to the first respondent’s Security and Loss Control personnel. He requested that the account that had been fraudulently opened in his name be closed. He enquired how the account could have been opened in his name without his knowledge. He learnt that customers are allowed to open bank accounts just by supplying their surname and national identity number without the requirement that they furnish an identity document for verification. The applicant discovered that the imposter who had opened an account in his name had even used a fictitious address No. 1034 Mabvuku Mabvuku. Trying to trace the imposter reached a dead end. Be that as it may, the first respondent went on to close the fraudulently opened account.

However, on 9 February 2021 it came to the applicant’s attention once again that another account number 6017042200062966 had been fraudulently opened with the first respondent in his name again. A potential victim of the rent to buy car scheme had had the good sense to trace the applicant via Facebook before parting with his money. Upon being alerted, the applicant immediately sought audience with the first respondent’s Security and Loss Control personnel. One Mr Ngobson Bandirai took the applicant’s complaint verbally and promised to investigate internally and get back to him as soon as possible which he never did until the applicant filed the present application on 13 February 2021. The applicant averred that as a result, he does not know the status of this new account as he received no feedback from the first respondent’s Security and Loss Control personnel.

It is the applicant’s contention that whatever the status of this account, it seems to him that as a long as the imposter involved remains at large, this vicious cycle will continue, not only against him but against members of the public as well since the first respondent’s digital banking system is fundamentally flawed. The system has no requirements for customer identification and verification when an account is being opened. The applicant went on to quote in full ss 13, 15, 16 and 17 of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act [Chapter 9:24]. These provisions deal with customer identification and verification requirements. In light of these provisions, the applicant averred that it is clear that the first respondent’s digital banking platforms are KYC non-compliant and unlawful. The applicant also averred that these digital banking platforms are also non-compliant with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Guidelines No. 01-2006 BUP/SML, particularly Article 11.7 which deals with general identification requirements. It is on this basis that the applicant is applying for an interim suspension of the operation of the first respondent’s three digital banking platforms pending the return day when he will be seeking a declaratur among other reliefs. The reliefs that he is seeking are couched as follows.

“INTERIM RELIF/PROVISONAL ORDER GRANTED

Pending the return day:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

Applicant’s application for an order suspending the operation of 1st respondent’s digital banking platforms namely:

a mobile banking platform under USSD quick code *220#;

a Whatsapp digital banking platform marketed as “Noku” under whatsapp Number +263776670211;

a mobile software application called ‘Mobile Moola App’ (‘the 1st respondent’s digital platforms’)

be and is hereby granted.

TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court, why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

The digital banking platforms of the 1st respondent namely:

a mobile banking platform under USSD quick code *220#;

a Whatsapp digital banking platform marketed as “Noku” under whatsapp Number +263776670211;

a mobile software application called ‘Mobile Moola App’ (‘the 1st respondent’s digital platforms’)

be and is hereby declared unlawful.

That the 1st respondent be and is hereby barred from launching any alternative mobile banking platforms that are non-compliant with ss 15, 16 and 17 of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act [Chapter 9:24].

That the 1st respondent be and is hereby ordered to regularise any and all customer bank accounts it holds that are non-complaint with ss 15, 16 and 17 of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crimes Act [Chapter 9:24] within 120 days of this order.

That the 1st respondent is hereby ordered to pay applicant’s costs of suit on a legal practitioner and own client scale.”

In response to the application the first respondent raised some preliminary points which I shall deal with later. The applicant filed an answering affidavit to the first respondent’s opposing affidavit and in doing so, he raised a point in limine that it is wrong for Sharon Manangara to depose to an affidavit purporting to act on behalf of the second respondent without the necessary authority in the form of a board resolution appointing her to do so. The applicant averred that under such circumstances no opposition was filed. I will dismiss this point in limine for the simple reason that it clearly states that it is attacking the opposing affidavit of the second respondent and not the first respondent. Besides, the deponent to the first respondent’s opposing affidavit is Sharon Manangazira and not Sharon Manangara. So, the point in limine bears no relationship with the first respondent. This probably explains why in the heads of argument, counsel for the first respondent did not address this point in limine at all. The point in limine raised by the applicant is thus dismissed.

I now turn to deal with the points in limine that were raised by the first respondent.

Procedural irregularities

The first respondent averred the following. The application is defective because it was not made in Form 29 with appropriate modifications. In Form 29, the notice of motion must invite the respondent to oppose the application and advise the respondent of its procedural rights if it intends to oppose the application. In casu the application did not invite the respondents to oppose the application nor did it set out the respondents’ procedural rights in so far as mounting a notice of opposition is concerned. The first respondent therefore applied that the application be struck off the roll with costs for non-compliance with the rules of the court; more so considering that the applicant is a legal practitioner who is well versed with the rules.

In response the applicant conceded that he used the wrong form. He however sought condonation by the court in the exercise of its discretion on the basis that the error that he made did not cause any prejudice to the first respondent in view of the fact that the court directed that the application be served on the respondents before the matter was decided. And service was effected. In view of the concession made by the applicant that he used the wrong form and the fact that he sought condonation for his non-compliance with the rules, I will in the interests of justice and in the exercise of my discretion, grant him condonation in terms of r 4C of the High Court Rules, 1971. No prejudice was suffered by the first respondent as a result of the non-compliance with the requirements of the rules that was made by the applicant. There was no prejudice because I ordered that the application be served on the respondents and when this was done, the first respondent did file its notice of opposition and opposing affidavit. I will thus dismiss the point in limine.

The interim relief sought by the applicant is final in nature

The first respondent averred that the interim relief that is being sought has the same substantive effect as the final relief and that the applicant is seeking to smuggle a final order under the guise of an interim relief which if granted will have the same effect with what he is seeking in the final order. If the applicant gets that relief, he will have no need to come back to court for confirmation of the order on the return day because he would have already obtained relief which is final in nature. Citing the cases of Cawood v Madzingira and Another HMA 12/17 and Kuvarega v Registrar-General and Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) the first respondent’s counsel submitted that a litigant cannot seek a final relief through an urgent chamber application.

In opposition the applicant disputed that the interim relief that he is seeking is final in nature. He averred that he is only seeking suspension of the operation of the digital banking platforms pending determination of the matter on the return day, of which on the return day, he will be seeking a declaratur that the digital platforms are unlawful. It is the applicant’s contention that the word ‘suspension’ connotes temporary prevention of use of the digital banking platforms which is different from their effective closure.

The cases of Cawood v Madzingira and Another and Kuvarega v Registrar-General and Anor that the first respondent referred to, state correctly the position of the law that a final order cannot be sought in a provisional order. However, it is my considered view that the interim relief that is being sought in casu does not have the effect of a final order. I am in agreement with the applicant that the suspension of the digital banking platforms that he is seeking is only temporary and is supposed to be effective between now and the return day. To suspend is to halt temporarily, defer, delay or postpone. With this, there is nothing final about the interim relief that the applicant is seeking. I thus dismiss this point in limine.

No cause of action

The first respondent made the following averments. The applicant did not in his application specify the nature of his cause of action but merely narrated facts and his disgruntlement without pointing out the basis in law which entitles him to seek the relief that he is seeking. The applicant did not state whether his cause of action arises from contract, delict or statute. The provisions of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act that the applicant says were not complied with do not empower him to approach the court as they do not create a cause of action for him as an individual. The enforcement of the particular Act is overseen by the Financial Intelligence Unit of the second respondent, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. For any grievance arising from the Act, the applicant ought to have brought it to the attention of the Financial Intelligence Unit. By approaching this court, the applicant is seeking to have this court usurp the administrative and statutory powers of the Financial Intelligence Unit. The dictates of administrative law prescribe that courts must allow an administrative body to first carry out its statutory mandate before interfering with its processes. In this instance, the Financial Intelligence Unit has not been afforded an opportunity to consider the alleged complaints against the first respondent, yet the applicant is already requesting the court to take over the powers of the Financial Intelligence Unit and completely suspend the first respondent’s digital banking platforms.

In response the applicant averred the following in his answering affidavit. When he went to see the first respondent’s personnel the first time, he discovered that an account had been opened in his name. Therefore, a banker-client relationship was established between him and the first respondent, although the account was opened without his knowledge and consent. Now that the account was later closed, as a former client he can sue for whatever happened when the banker-client relationship was established. The applicant contended that it is clear that his cause of action is premised in contract. The applicant averred that when he learnt that a second account had been opened in his name once again, and went back to first respondent with a query, its personnel never gave him feedback as they had promised to do. They never told him that the account was not in his name. The applicant further averred that the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act does not preclude any person whose interests have been perverted from approaching the court in the manner that he did. He added that constitutionally, he has a right to do so despite the fact that he is an individual.

From this response it is clear that the applicant makes mention of two causes of action. Firstly, in contract. Secondly, in terms of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act yet in the founding affidavit it does not come out that his cause of action is contract based. There is no mention whatsoever that the applicant is suing on the basis of a contractual relationship that was created between the parties when an account was fraudulently opened in his name by some person unknown to him. As was correctly stated by the first respondent, the applicant’s founding affidavit is largely a never-ending narration of what the applicant perceives to be the law on the operation of digital banking platforms. He goes to extensive lengths quoting the provisions of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act, that is, ss 13, 15,16 and 17. He also quoted Article 11.3 of the RBZ Guidelines from Article 11 3.1 to 11.3.8 and article 11.7 from Article 11.7.1 to 11.7.17. All this took 7 full pages from page 15 to page 22. The founding affidavit is 29 pages long. Quoting the statutory provisions and the RBZ guidelines was irrelevant and unnecessary. Be that as it may, what comes out as the cause of action in the founding affidavit is the first respondent’s non-compliance with the provisions of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act. That the cause of action is contract based is something that the applicant says in his answering affidavit in response to the point in limine.

Clearly, this is a new cause of action that he raises, yet he never pleaded or established it in his founding affidavit. It goes without saying that the applicant does not know exactly what his cause of action is.

As was correctly submitted by the first respondent, in application proceedings just like in action proceedings, there is need for the applicant to plead or establish his or her cause of action in his or her founding affidavit.  If the applicant is relying on two causes of action, he or she needs to plead them both and set out facts that establish them in the founding affidavit albeit in the alternative. The applicant cannot seek to plead and establish his or her cause of action for the first time in the answering affidavit. It is in the founding affidavit that the applicant should lay out his or her legal basis for seeking the relief that he or she is seeking. If the applicant is seeking an interdict as is the case in the present matter, he or she should lay out the legal basis for seeking the interdict. A cause of action in law, is a set of facts sufficient to justify suing to obtain relief. It is a legal theory upon which a plaintiff or applicant brings a suit. The applicant’s averments in the founding affidavit should therefore allege facts that encompass the legal wrong he or she claims to have suffered and the remedy or the relief he or she is asking the court to grant. Causes of action can be based in contract, delict, statute, etc. The cause of action is the heart of the complaint and it is the pleading that initiates a lawsuit. Without an adequately stated cause of action, the applicant’s case should be dismissed at the outset. This is because without a cause of action, a civil suit cannot arise. In Jirira v Zimcor Trustees Limited and Another HH98/10 at p 4, MAKARAU JP (as she then was) in dismissing the application that was before her said,

“The point I am making is that it is the duty of the legal practitioner to screen from the

story told them by their client, the legal issues arising and then to plead such with precision

and in accordance with the law. To simply repeat the entire story as told by the client and

using the imprecise language that lay people use may amount to incompetence on the part of

the legal practitioner.

In view of the vague cause of action that the applicant is relying on, it is my view that

it will serve no purpose for me to refer the matter to trial with the papers standing as summons and appearance to defend respectively. There is in my view no cause of action disclosed in the papers at this stage.”

From the above case it is clear that it is not sufficient merely to state that certain events occurred that entitle the applicant to relief. All the elements of the cause of action must be detailed in the founding affidavit. Therefore, in a cause of action, what needs to be stated is (i) the applicable rule of law, (ii) the facts that give rise to the relief that is being sought and (iii) the facts that show that the respondent is liable for the relief the applicant is seeking. In view of this, the applicant in casu cannot aver that he is suing in contract simply because he has given a narration of events that he says entitles him to relief. In any case a cause of action based in contract in the circumstances of the present matter would not be correct for the following reasons. A contract is an agreement which is enforceable at law or which is intended to be enforceable at law. As such for an agreement to be reached there should be consent, or a meeting of the minds, or a coincidence of the wills or consensus ad idem by the parties entering into that agreement. In the absence of a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties, there cannot be a valid or binding contract. There is however, what is called the doctrine of privity of contract which encompasses the rules of agency, such that a principal becomes a party to a contract entered into on his behalf by his or her agent. Under this doctrine, the principal must have authorised his or her agent to enter into the contract on his behalf. Therefore, this means that if a contract is fraudulently entered into on a person’s behalf without their knowledge and consent by an imposter, that contract is invalid and not binding between the parties as there was never a meeting of the minds. The doctrine of freedom of contract in contract law provides that a person is free to enter or not to enter into a contract with whom they please. So, a contract which is fraudulently entered into in the name of another person without their knowledge and consent is not consistent with the doctrine of freedom of contract. As such, such a contract is not valid and it creates no rights and obligations between the parties. None of the parties can act and sue upon it.

In casu the applicant did not personally open an account with first respondent. Neither did he authorise anyone to open an account on his behalf. So, he never contracted with the first respondent. Therefore, he was never a client of the first respondent. He therefore cannot say a banker-client relationship was created when some imposter fraudulently opened an account in his name without his knowledge and consent. These principles of contract law are elementary. It is also surprising that the applicant seeks to approbate and reprobate or blow hot and cold or have his cake and eat it. On one hand he says that the account was fraudulently opened without his knowledge and consent and he sought its closure. On the other hand, he says he is suing in contract on the basis of that same fraudulently opened account. He cannot challenge the validity of the contract and at the same time sue on the basis of that same invalid contract.

The second bank account which the applicant claimed to have been opened in his name was found not to being in his name, but in the name of a Mr Frank Chinyoka, an averment which the applicant did not dispute in his answering affidavit. However, even if this second account had been opened in the applicant’s name, that account would still not entitle him to sue in contract because the contract would have been invalid just like the first one. The foregoing shows that the applicant has no legal basis to sue the first respondent in contract. He thus cannot have a cause of action under the law of contract.

The second cause of action that the applicant relies on is that the first respondent is not complying with the provisions of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act. From his founding affidavit it is clear that this is the cause of action that he pleaded and sought to establish hence the extensive quotation of the provisions of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act. However, as was correctly contended by the first respondent, even if it is true that the first respondent is not complying with the provisions of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act, the failure to comply by the first respondent does not provide the applicant with a cause of action to sue for the reliefs that he is seeking. It is not for him as an individual to enforce compliance with the Act by the first respondent even if he has suffered prejudice as a result of the non-compliance. In terms of s 3 of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act, it is the Financial Intelligence Unit that bears the primary and general responsibility of ensuring compliance with the Act by financial institutions. The provision reads,

“3 Unit and competent supervisory authorities to cooperate in securing compliance

with this Act

(1) ….

[Subsection repealed by Act 12 of 2018]

(2) The Unit, acting with the cooperation of the competent supervisory authorities, bears the primary and general responsibility for ensuring compliance with this Act.

(3) Competent supervisory authorities shall, under the guidance of the Unit, supervise compliance with the applicable requirements of this Act by the financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses or professions for which they are responsible.”

The unit that is being referred to in s 3 (2) is defined in section 2 of the Act as the Financial Intelligence Unit. Section 6A of the Act states that this unit is an administrative establishment of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. In other words, therefore, it is the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, the second respondent which has the role of ensuring that financial institutions comply with the provisions of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act.  An individual cannot therefore assume the role of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe even if they have suffered prejudice as a result of non-compliance with statutory provisions by a financial institution. The first respondent averred that the best that the applicant ought to have done was to report it to the Financial Intelligence Unit of the second respondent for enforcement of compliance. I am in agreement. In Local Authorities Pension Fund v Munyaradzi Nyakwawa and Ors 2015 (1) ZLR 103 (H) Mafusire J at 113 D-F held that;

“The above confusion serves to emphasise the importance of elegance and precision in pleadings. The statutory provisions being relied upon for any cause of action have to be identified. But be that as it may, even if it was the pension fund’s intention to rely on the Bank Use Promotion Act, or the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act, in my view, it still comes short. Even if it was meant to plead that the bank breached some of the provisions of those Acts and would therefore be liable to suffer criminal sanction, that breach would still not transform into civil liability to the pension fund. In my view, as with negligence in the air, this would be “criminality in the air” in relation to the pension fund. The causal link would be absent. (my underlining)

In view of the foregoing, the applicant does not have a cause of action in terms of the Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act to sue for the reliefs that he is seeking

In the circumstances of the present matter, it cannot however be disputed that the applicant suffered harm as a result of a bank account that was opened with the first respondent, by an imposter, in his name. From the averments that the applicant made in his founding affidavit, the first respondent created a system that is open to abuse. The system of opening accounts on the digital banking platforms is inadequate as it allowed for an imposter to fraudulently open an account in applicant’s name without his knowledge and authority. When the account was opened one Samantha Ndaba was duped into depositing money into that account. She made demands, on applicant’s Facebook page, that he refunds her. Reports were made against him to the Law Society of Zimbabwe. Obviously, all this injured the applicant. However, the first respondent closed that account as soon as the applicant brought the issue to its attention. With that account having been closed, the applicant had no reason to approach this court for an interdict unless there was a reasonable apprehension that the opening of another fictitious account in his name would be repeated. An interdict is appropriate only when future injury is feared. The applicant must therefore establish on a balance of probabilities that there are grounds for a reasonable apprehension that the injury that occurred to him or her will be repeated in future and that his rights will be detrimentally affected. The applicant will also need to show that the harm or injury will be caused by the respondent or alternatively that the prevention of the harm is within the respondent’s power. If he can prove his case, the court can grant him an interdict to restrain the threatened conduct. In the circumstances of this case, I do not see why the applicant would not be entitled to sue the first respondent in delict for such an interdict if he can establish on a balance of probabilities that there are grounds for a reasonable apprehension that another fictitious account will be opened in his name. Whilst it is the first respondent’s contention that it is not the one that opened the fictitious account, it is a fact that it is the one that created the digital banking platforms that are being abused by unscrupulous members of society. As such it is within its powers to prevent harm or a breach of the applicant’s rights. Therefore, an interdict, in an appropriate case, may well be granted against it.

However, the second account which the applicant said was opened in his name, which account is the one that prompted him to file the application, turned out not to be in his name. With the first account having been shut down by the respondent, that leaves the applicant with no cause of action for the relief of an interdict to protect his rights in future. He has no facts giving cause or ground for judicial intervention. There are no facts upon which it can be found that there is a reasonable apprehension that another fictitious account will be opened in his name. But assuming that there were such facts, it would still be impossible to grant the interdicts the applicant is seeking both in the interim and on the return day. This is because of the nature of the interdicts that the applicant is seeking. The interdicts are not personal and specific to him, if granted they will affect the whole world. Even the declarator that he will be seeking on the return day has the same effect. Every person who either has an existing account now or who does not have but might want to open an account with the first respondent in future will be affected by these interdicts and declaratur if they are granted. The effect of the reliefs sought is to completely shut down the digital banking platforms of the first respondent.

It is the applicant’s contention that there are criminal elements out there that have a mind set to use his identification number and those of many other clients of the first respondent and the general public who are not the first respondent’s clients. However, as was correctly averred by the first respondent, the applicant cannot premise his cause of action on grievances of third parties which do not exist, and without receiving authority to represent them in the protection of their rights. The applicant can only seek such relief if he is bringing a class action on behalf of people that share the same injury or harm as himself. To institute a class action, certain requirements that are stipulated in the Class Actions Act [chapter 8:17] ought to be met.  The most basic requirement is for the applicant to have sought leave from this court to bring a class action. See s 3 of the Class Actions Act [Chapter 8:17]. The applicant also needed to have been appointed by the High Court to be the representative of the class of persons concerned in the class action. See s 5 (1) of the Class Actions Act. The applicant should appreciate that not every other person was injured as he was injured. As such it is wrong for the applicant to seek reliefs that stop the operation of the first respondent’s digital banking platform in its entirety to the prejudice of the generality of the population. An injury to the applicant cannot be an injury to everyone. Whilst he might have a genuine complaint, his relief cannot be a total shut down of the whole digital banking system of the first respondent. An order affecting the existing 49000 customers of the first respondent cannot be granted against them without them having been given an opportunity to be heard.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the applicant has no cause of action that justifies the closure of the first respondent’s entire digital baking platforms; even on a temporary basis pending the return day. As I have already discussed above, if the applicant could show on a balance of probabilities, that there is a reasonable apprehension of fear that another fictitious account would be opened in his name in future, that would entitle him to obtain an interdict. But even then, the reliefs that he should be seeking should relate to him and him alone.

In view of the foregoing, I will uphold the point in limine that there is no cause of action which entitles the applicant to be granted the reliefs that he is seeking.

I thus make the following order: -

1.	The application is dismissed with costs.

Dube, Manikai & Hwacha, 1st respondent’s legal practitioners