Super Quality Bar (Bridge 21) v Clatos Pfuwai

### Preamble
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE HARARE, 28 JULY 2025
JUDGMENT NO. LC/ H/271/25
CASE NO. LC/H/553/25
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IN THE LABOUR COURT OF ZIMBABWE HARARE, 28 JULY 2025

AND

30 JULY 2025

JUDGMENT NO. LC/ H/271/25

CASE NO. LC/H/553/25

SUPER QUALITY BAR (BRIDGE 21)	APPLICANT

CLATOS PFUWAI	RESPONDENT

Before the Honourable G. Musariri Judge:

For Applicant	T. Shoko, Attorney

For Respondent	G. Majirija, Attorney

MUSARIRI, J:

Applicant applied to this Court for the reinstatement of its abandoned appeal referenced LCH 420/25. The application was made in terms of Rule 36 of the Labour Court Rules, 2017.

At the onset of oral argument, respondent raised 2 (two) points in limine which shall be addressed ad seriatim.

A That the locus standi of the applicant has not been established:

The respondent’s opposing affidavit stated that

“4.1 The capacity of the applicant has not been established. It is not clear whether the applicant is a registered company, a partnership or a common law universities. Whether the applicant has capacity to sue in a court of law has not been established in this application.

4.2 The failure to establish the capacity of the applicant to institute current proceedings makes the current application fatally defective and it ought to be dismissed with costs on a higher scale.”

Applicant’s heads of argument do not address the point raised by respondent. Though applicant’s attorney conceded that applicant’s corporate status was not set out in the founding affidavit she sought to rely on prior proceedings to prove applicant’s status.

The founding affidavit introduces the applicant tersely thus,

“1. I am the Applicant’s legal practitioner.”

There is no attempt to set out applicant’s status as a company, partnership, universitas other entity. It is clearly not a natural person. Therefore its capacity to sue or be sued has not been established. This conclusion is consonant with the dicta in the case of

Nguluwe v Dewa HH 387/23 Per Maxwell J

“The right to sue or the liability to be sued depends in the first place on capacity. In order to be capable of either suing or being sued, a person must have locus standi in judico. Consequently, persons who are wanting in that capacity cannot be parties to any civil action…”

That T. Shoko, the deponent to the founding affidavit lacked authority to represent the applicant:

The respondent’s opposing affidavit stated that.

“5.1 The deponent to the Founding Affidavit, Tariro M. Shoko does not have authority to depose to the founding affidavit on behalf of the applicant. She alleges that she is the applicant’s legal practitioner but does not go ahead to state that she has been authorised by the applicant to institute current proceedings on its behalf. Neither does she confirm that the applicant has sanctioned the institution of the current proceedings.

5.2 No resolution has been attached to the applicant’s founding papers to show that it is the applicant which is litigating and not an unauthorised individual. Indeed, it appears that Tariro Shoko is a vigilante, or torch bearer who acts of her own accord and does not have the legal authority, or standing to commence the present proceedings.”

Applicant’s heads of argument do not address this point. In oral argument its attorney said it is ‘client’ who instructed them to institute the present proceedings. The question of representation of corporates in court was settled by the case of

Dube  v  PSMAS

2019(3) ZLR 589(S)

Per Garwe JCC at 598E

“…A person who represents a legal entity, when challenged, must show that he is duly authorised to represent the entity … He must produce a resolution of the board of that entity which confirms that the board is indeed aware of the proceedings and that it has given such person the authority to act in the stead of the entity.”

Applicant’s attorney (T. Shoko) did not produce the requisite resolution which would prove her authority to depose the founding affidavit on behalf of applicant.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analyses shows that the both points in limine are laden with merit. Per force they ought to be upheld with consequential relief.

Wherefore it is ordered that,

The respondent’s points in limine be and are hereby upheld;

The application for reinstatement of appeal is hereby struck off the roll as a nullity; and

Each party shall bear its own costs.

J-U-D-G-E